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The Capacity of International Law




In all areas of the globe, segments of humanity are clinging to bonds
of race, language, religion, kinship, and custom, and are projecting those
bonds into the political future. In all too many instances, recent events
remind us, the interactive patterns of ethnic and national groupings are
oppressed by structures of human organization grounded in the modern
system of states. The native tribes of the American continents, the Quebe-
cois, the Baltic peoples, the Eritreans, the Kurds, and the Basques are all
examples of groups that have been challenging the state structures that
engulf them.
Comprehensively formulated, claims of ethnic or nationality groups
can be divided into two categories. One category corresponds to claims of
nondiscrimination and equal treatment for the members of the group
within the context of a larger social setting. Examples of such claims are in
the civil rights movement that coalesced in the 1950s and 1960s in the
United States and in the campaign against apartheid in South Africa.
International law has provided clear support for these claims. The nondis-
crimination ideal has been firmly embedded and elaborated in major
international legal instruments, such as the United Nations Charter,' the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,2 the International Human Rights
Covenants,3 and the International Covenant on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination.
4
tDelivered at the 1990 Conference of the U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. Scholars Dialogue on Human
Rights and the Future, which was jointly sponsored by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences
through its Institute of State and the American Council of Learned Societies, in Moscow (June
19-21, 1990).
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A. 1980, University of New Mexico; J.D.
1983, Harvard University.
I. E.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (affirming "respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion").
2. E.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 2, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), 3(1) U.N.
GAOR at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.").
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2(1), G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec 16,
1966, art. 2(2), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
4. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965) (entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969).
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The second category is comprised of those claims in which ethnic
communities seek some degree of separation or autonomy from the rest of
the population of the state in which they are located. Examples include the
secessionist efforts of the Baltic peoples in the Soviet Union and attempts at
greater autonomy on the part of Indian tribes of North America and other
indigenous peoples around the world.
Although the words "all peoples have the right to self-determination"
have made their way into the texts of major multilateral treaties,5 interna-
tional law has yet to clearly embrace claims for political autonomy beyond
the context of classical colonialism. Still, the affirmation of self-
determination of peoples has provided a wedge for ethnic autonomy claims
to make their way prominently into contemporary international legal and
political discourse. My comments focus on this second category of ethnic
and nationality claims and on the institutional capacities of international
law to embrace a theory of self-determination to uphold them.
6
IL THE HISTORICAL SOVEREIGNTY APPROACH TO AUTONOMY CLAIMS
Ethnic group claims of autonomy take on one or a combination of two
basic approaches. One I will call the historical sovereignty approach. Under
this approach, self-determination is invoked to restore the asserted "sover-
eignty" of an historical community that roughly corresponds to the
contemporary claimant group. This approach generally accepts the
premise of Western theoretical origins of a world divided into territorially
defined, independent or "sovereign" states. However, this approach per-
ceives an alternative and competing political geography based on an
assessment of historically based communities. Thus, for example, represen-
tatives of North American Indian tribes often rely on assertions of
pre-Columbian nationhood or sovereignty in making claims for greater
political autonomy.
There are at least three aspects of international law limiting this
approach. The first limitation is in the so-called doctrine of intertemporal
law, which judges historical events according to the law in effect at the time
of their occurrence. 6 However unfortunately, international law has oper-
ated in historical periods to validate the acquisition of territory by states
regardless of the wishes of the indigenous population. Dominant earlier
formulations of the doctrines of conquest and effective occupation, for
example, upheld the empire building that led to the current political
configuration of the Americas. 7
5. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, supra note 3;
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1, supra note 3; see also
U.N. Charter art. 1(2).
6. See Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 845 (1928) ("a
juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the
law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises .... ).
7. See, e.g., I C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Applied and Interpreted by the
United States 163-71, 175 (1922) ("states were agreed that the native inhabitants possessed no
rights of territorial control which the European explorer or his monarch was bound to
respect"); J. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law 129-66 (1894)
(discussing territorial sovereignty in relation to "uncivilized" regions); see also Eastern
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There are, of course, situations in which the doctrine of intertemporal
law is not an impediment. In the situation of the Baltic republics, for
instance, a quite persuasive case has been made that their forced annex-
ation into the Soviet Union in 1940 was an illegal usurpation of the
republics' status as independent sovereign states, both under contemporary
norms and the norms of international law applicable at that time.8 In the
same vein, a good case can be made that the international law of the
sixteenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries embraced the treaties
concluded during that period between the European powers and many
American Indian tribes.9 Most of these treaties upheld the tribes' powers of
self-governance, although within diminished spheres. Assessing the vitality
of these treaties for the purposes of contemporary international law,
however, is complicated by the intervening period in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries in which international law appears to have
rejected the international status of treaties with non-European aboriginal
peoples.10
A second aspect of international law that limits its capacity to embrace
ethnic autonomy claims along the historical sovereignty approach is the
matter of recognition. Recognition is a phenomenon of international legal
process which "may validate situations of dubious origin."'" That is, when
a preponderance of states, international organizations, and other relevant
international actors recognize a state's boundaries and corresponding
sovereignty over territory, international law upholds the recognized sover-
eignty as a matter of traditionally held foundational principle.' 2 Interna-
tional legal process thus hardly questions whether the territory was ac-
quired by lawful means, leaving little room for groups within the cloak of
a recognized sovereign to assert competing sovereignty solely on the basis
of historical conditions or events.
As with the doctrine of intertemporal law, recognition may not be a
major obstacle in limited circumstances. Again, the Baltics provide an
example. The United States and the Western European countries declined
to recognize the annexation of the Baltic republics by the Soviet Union in
1940 and established an official position of nonrecognition of Soviet
Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (determining territorial sovereignty
over Eastern Greenland without regard to the indigenous Inuit population); Cayuga Indians
(Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173, 176 (1926) (holding that an Indian "tribe is not
a legal unit of international law").
8. See Materials of the International Scientific Conference" on Legal Assessment of the
USSR-Germany Pacts of August 23 and September 28, 1939, 39 Proceedings of the Estonian
Academy of Sciences 97 (1990).
9. See Clinebell & Thompson, Sovereignty and Self- Determination: The Rights of Native
Americans Under International Law, 27 Buffalo L. Rev. 666, 679-93 (1978); Morris, In
Support of the Right of Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples Under International Law,
29 German Y.B. Int'l L. 277, 291 (1986).
10. See Island of Palmas, supra note 6, at 831 ("contracts between a State... and native princes
or chiefs of peoples not recognized as members of the community of nations ... are not, in the
international law sense, treaties or conventions capable of creating rights and obligations..
see also supra note 7.
11. M. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa 23 (1986); see also I. Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law 163-64 (3d ed. 1979) (discussing acquiescence and recognition).
12. See I. Brownlie, supra note 11, at 287.
75 IOWA LAW REVIEW
sovereignty over them.' 3 This position apparently has not changed, even
though no major power has come forward and expressly welcomed any of
the Baltic nations into the community of independent states, as Lithuania,
the most independence minded of them, repeatedly has requested.
A third aspect of international law that limits the historical sovereignty
approach to ethnic autonomy claims, and perhaps the most significant
institutional limitation, is a normative trend within international legal
process toward stability through pragmatism over instability, even at the
expense of traditional principle.' 4 Sociologists estimate that today there are
around 5,000 discrete ethnic or national groupings in the world, 15 and each
of these groups is defined-and defines itself-in significant part by
reference to history. This figure dwarfs the number of the independent
states in the world today, approximately 176. Further, of the numerous
stateless cultural groupings that have been deprived of something like
sovereignty at some point in their history, many have likewise deprived
other groups of autonomy at some point in time. If international law were
to fully embrace ethnic autonomy claims on the basis of the historical
sovereignty approach, the number of potential challenges to existing state
boundaries, along with the likely uncertainties of having to assess compet-
ing sovereignty claims over time, could bring the international system into
a condition of legal flux and make international law an agent of instability
rather than stability.
Accordingly, the major contemporary international organizations and
tribunals have resisted a model of self-determination that would realign
state boundaries and create new ones according to a simple formula of
historical community. The United Nations did not promote the decoloni-
zation of Africa and Asia through a policy of restoring precolonial political
units based primarily on tribal affiliations. Rather, U.N. policy was to
pursue the independence of the colonial territories whose boundaries were
widely acknowledged to be artificial in relation to the indigenous
population. 16 The Organization of African Unity also adopted this policy
after some debate.'
7
The International Court of Justice followed in this direction in the
Western Sahara Case.'8 The case involved the decolonization of the Saharan
territory formerly under Spanish rule. The Court, in an Advisory Opinion,
acknowledged that colonial political communities linked peoples of the
13. B. Kaslas, The Baltic Nations: The Quest for Regional Integration and Political
Liberty 274-83 (1976) (discussing the history of relations between the Baltic states and the
Soviet Union and the reaction of the United States and Western Europe).
14. See generally L. Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law 3-14 (1989)
(discussing the importance of a global context for decisionmaking).
15. R. Stavenhagen, Problems and Prospects of Multiethnic States, The United Nations
University Annual Lecture Series No. 3, at 5 (1986).
16. See C. Mojekwu, Self-Determination: The African Perspective, in Self-Determination:
National, Regional, and Global Dimensions 221, 228-29 (Y. Alexander & R. Friedlander eds.
1980).
17. See id. at 230-31; Ramphul, The Role of International and Regional Organizations in
the Peaceful Settlement of Internal Disputes (with Special Emphasis on the Organization of
African Unity), 13 Ga.J. Int'l & Comp. L. 371, 377-78 (1983).
18. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (1975).
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Western Sahara with adjoining Morocco and Mauritania through historical
spheres of influence and allegiance. 19 But the Court held that such "legal
ties" should not influence the application of the principle of self-
determination in the decolonization of the Western Sahara. Instead, the
Court favored a model of self-determination by which the future status of
the territory would be determined through the free and genuine expression
of the will of its contemporary inhabitants.20
Given all these considerations, my view is that international law cannot
easily embrace claims of ethnic or nationality group autonomy primarily
based on accounts of the pre-existence and wresting of sovereignty.
III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO AUTONOMY CLAIMS
A second approach, suggested by the International Court of Justice in
the Western Sahara Case, focuses on contemporary human interaction and
values, and, I believe, holds greater possibilities for the advancement of
autonomy claims through international law. I will call this second approach
the human rights approach.
Under this approach, self-determination is not linked fundamentally
to historically derived "sovereign" entities which are described in somewhat
static terms and projected into the future. Rather, self-determination arises
within international law's expanding lexicon of human rights concerns and
accordingly is posited as a fundamental right that attaches collectively to
groups of living human beings. In the decolonization context, the interna-
tional community preferred a human rights approach, which succeeded in
breaking down the colonial empires that extended into Africa, Asia and
elsewhere. In that context, relevant actors conceived of self-determination
as the right of the contemporary inhabitants of colonized territories to be
free from outside domination, a right derived from notions of freedom,
equality, and peace.2 1 Independent statehood for the colonial territories,
understandably, was the norm.
In applying the principle of self-determination to the context of
contemporary ethnic autonomy claims within the human rights approach,
other evolving human rights concepts come into play-especially the
concept of cultural integrity. An emergent human right of cultural survival
and flourishment within international law is signaled by the United Nations
Charter,22 article 27 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant,23 the
19. Id. at 45-49, 64-65.
20. Id. at 68. The Court, however, held that the "legal ties" it found did not amount to ties
of "territorial sovereignty," thus leaving open the possibility that a certain showing of historical
sovereignty could govern the application of the principle of self-determination, at least in the
decolonization context in which the sovereignty of the colonial powers over overseas territories
no longer was propped up by the phenomenon of international recognition.
2 1. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
Dec. 14, 1960, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1961).
22. U.N. Charter arts. 13, 55, 57, and 73 (affirming cultural cooperation and development
as among the purposes of the U.N.).
23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, supra note 3 (recognizing
the right of the members of "ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities... to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practise their own religion [and] to use their own language").
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Convention Against Genocide, 24 and the UNESCO Declaration of Princi-
ples of Cultural Co-operation. 25 Joining the human values of freedom,
equality, and peace with those represented in the principle of cultural
integrity can provide potentjustification for ethnic autonomy claims. In the
context of indigenous peoples, for example, a U.N. study has concluded
that self-governance is
an inherent part of their cultural and legal heritage which has
contributed to their cohesion and to the maintenance of their
social and cultural tradition .... Self-determination, in its many
forms, is thus a basic pre-condition if indigenous peoples are to be
able to enjoy their fundamental rights and determine their future,
while at the same time preserving, developing and passing on
their specific ethnic identity to future generations.
26
Despite its appeal, the human rights approach raises a specter of
destabilization contrary to international law's normative trends, if phrased
in absolutist terms insisting on a right to choose independent statehood
even in cases when the right-holders may in fact desire some lesser status.
It is thus helpful, and perhaps imperative, to move beyond the independent
statehood rhetoric if self-determination is to be meaningful in the context
of most current ethnic autonomy claims.
In my view, self-determination should not be equated with a right to
independent statehood. Under a human rights approach, the concept of
self-determination is capable of embracing much more nuanced interpre-
tations and applications, particularly in an increasingly interdependent
world in which the formal attributes of statehood mean less and less.
Self-determination may be understood as a right of cultural groupings to
the political institutions necessary to allow them to exist and develop
according to their distinctive characteristics. The institutions and degree of
autonomy, necessarily, will vary as the circumstances of each case vary. And
in determining the required conditions for a claimant group, decisionmak-
ers must weigh in the human rights of others. While not precluded,
independent statehood will be justified only in rare instances. Such a
formulation of self-determination, I believe, will advance global peace and
stability consistent with international law's normative trends.
Even when understood in such nonabsolutist terms, the human rights
approach to ethnic autonomy claims continues to face impediments arising
from within the fabric of international law. I see two remaining, but not
insurmountable, problems. First, there is the individualistic bias toward
24. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1961) (defining, at article II, genocide as
"acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such ... ").
25. Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, Proclaimed by the
General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
at its fourteenth session on Nov. 4, 1966, reprinted in United Nations, Human Rights: A
Compilation of International Instruments at 409, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.3 (1988) (affirming
a right and duty of all peoples to protect and develop the cultures throughout humankind).
26. U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities:
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/
Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 at 20 (1987) (Jose R. Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur).
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human rights conceptions within modem international law which impedes
the recognition of collective or group rights. This bias results from
traditional Western liberal political philosophy that has provided the major
impetus for the development of human rights in international law.2 7 As I
have discussed elsewhere, the Western liberal perspective
acknowledges the rights of the individual on the one hand and the
sovereignty of the total social collective on the other, but it is not
alive to the rich variety of intermediate or alternative associational
groupings actually found in human cultures, nor is it prepared to
ascribe to such groupings any rights not reducible either to the
liberties of the citizen or to the prerogatives of the state.
28
International legal and political discourse, however, has made signif-
icant movement toward greater realization of collective or group rights. An
important example is in the treatment of indigenous peoples' concerns
within the United Nations and its affiliate, the International Labour
Organization. The recent draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 29 developed by a working group of the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, and the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples,3 0 adopted by the 1989 International Labour Conference, both
address indigenous peoples' rights as rights of collectivities. Also, the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights3 1 elaborates upon the
group rights of the family and "peoples" as distinct from individual or
states' rights.
A second limitation, related to the matter of recognition discussed
above, is in the classical international law doctrine of state sovereignty.3 2 The
doctrine of sovereignty-together with its corollaries of territorial integrity,
exclusive jurisdiction, and nonintervention -impedes the capacity of inter-
national law to regulate matters within the spheres of authority asserted by
states recognized by the international community. Sovereignty is especially
jealous of matters of social and political organization. I believe, however,
that to the extent a claim for ethnic autonomy can be posited as a human
rights concern, state sovereignty impediments can be overcome.
Within modern international law, the doctrine of sovereignty increas-
ingly has become subject to the human rights values embraced by the
international community. In a global community that remains organized
27. See generally Weston, Human Rights, in Human Rights in the World Community:
Issues and Action (R. Claude & B. Weston eds. 1989) (discussing the Western liberal origins
of modern human rights conceptions).
28. Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law in Historical and
Contemporary Perspective, 1989 Harv. Indian L. Symp. 191, 198 (1990).
29. U.N. Doc. EICN.41Sub.211989133.
30. International Labor Organization Convention (No.169) Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, International Labour Conference, Draft Report of
the Committee on Convention 107 at 25-33, Provisional Record (No. 25) 76th Session (1989),
in Basic Documents In International Law and World Order 489 (B. Weston, R. Falk, & A.
D'Amato 2d ed. 1990).
31. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, June 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
32. See generally I. Brownlie, supra note 11, at 287-97 (characterizing sovereignty as the
"basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations").
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substantially by state jurisdictional boundaries, sovereignty principles con-
tinue, in some measure, to advance human values of stability and ordered
liberty. But since the atrocities and suffering of the two world wars,
international law has not much upheld sovereignty principles when they
serve as an accomplice to the subjugation of human rights or act as a shield
against international concern that coalesces to promote human values. The
proliferation of a floor of human rights norms that are deemed applicable
to all states as to their own citizens and the decolonization process itself both
demonstrate the yielding of sovereignty principles to human rights imper-
atives in modern international law.33
IV. CONCLUSION
International law is not easily disposed to aid autonomy claims that
challenge state structures simply on the strength of alternative visions of
sovereignty founded primarily on evaluations of history. Such an approach
imposes great tensions upon the institutional framework of international
law. International law, I believe, can best accommodate ethnic autonomy
claims if they are justified on human rights grounds and avoid absolutist
assertions of independent statehood. To be sure, ethnic communities are
the product of both present and past conditions and events. Historical
phenomena can have great relevance to the contemporary life of a
community and thus be meaningful in terms of human rights. A human
rights approach does not necessarily exclude consideration of historical
conditions, but it refocuses such consideration into a larger assessment of
the requirements for the present day realization of human values. Through
its human rights discourse, modern international law is hospitable to such
as assessment and its concern for the values implicated in ethnic and
nationality rights claims.
33. See Anaya, supra note 28, at 211-15.
[1990]
